Cambodia: Crackdown on opposition before July elections

Ahead of the general election on 23 July, the Cambodian government has cracked down on the political opposition, independent media, and civil society in the country. While this has triggered some demonstration activity, repression under Prime Minister Hun Sen has limited people’s ability to protest. This repression can be seen in Hun Sen’s recent threats of violence on Facebook against those who question his party’s vote-buying in recent local elections; the threats led the social media company to recommend the suspension of his account in June.¹ In May, the main opposition party, the Candlelight Party, was disqualified from running in the upcoming elections for ostensibly failing to submit a verified copy of its original party registration document to the Ministry of Interior. However, the motivation for the disqualification has been widely seen as political. In February, the operating license of Voice of Democracy (VOD), a media outlet providing coverage of protests and human rights issues, was revoked. The media outlet sparked Hun Sen’s ire after publishing a report critical of his eldest son, Hun Manet.² The closure of VOD led to a series of protests by those concerned with the ongoing restrictions on freedom of expression.³ Hun Sen’s crackdown has also extended to those advocating for labor rights, as seen by union leader Chhim Sithar’s conviction in May on charges of “incitement.”⁴ Sithar and other employees of NagaWorld, a casino in Phnom Penh, have been protesting since 2021, demanding to be reinstated and fairly compensated following mass layoffs.⁵ The NagaWorld protests drove a spike in demonstrations in the country in 2022, with such demonstrations accounting for over 64% of total demonstrations. Nearly half of the NagaWorld demonstrations in 2022 were met with state intervention.

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Bangladesh: Elevated Kuki-Chin National Army violence

Violence in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts region has been at elevated levels since March this year, with over 10 events involving the group reported in the last four months. This violence – concentrated in Bandarban district – is driven in part by events involving the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA), an armed group demanding the creation of an autonomous state for the Kuki-Chin people within Bangladesh. In June, two military personnel were reportedly killed by IEDs set off by the KNA in Bandarban. The Bangladesh government has cracked down on the KNA since late 2022 amid reports of links between the KNA and the Islamist militant group, Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS). Authorities allege that the KNA provided arms, training, and shelter to JAFHS in exchange for funding.⁶ The KNA has denied the allegations.⁷ On 23 June, police arrested the founder of JAFHS when he was in Dhaka.⁸ The military crackdown against the KNA has led to an influx of Kuki-Chin refugees into India.⁹

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Myanmar: Border Guard Force defections amid increased fighting in Kayah state

Political violence increased by over 50% in Kayah state in June relative to May as fighting between the military and resistance forces intensified, augmented by the defection of formerly military-aligned fighters. Fighting was concentrated in Hpasawng and Mese townships. The military increased its use of airstrikes in the state, targeting both resistance groups and civilians alike. Significantly, two previously military-aligned Border Guard Force (BGF) battalions joined resistance forces,¹⁰ carrying out attacks and capturing a police station and three military outposts in Mese township on 13 June.¹¹ The two battalions are part of the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), which split from the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) in 1978. It later agreed to a ceasefire with the military in 1994. The group then transformed two of its five battalions into BGF battalions under the military’s scheme in 2009.¹² The KNPLF has now joined with the KNPP/KA, the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) in what has been reportedly called the 4K Alliance.¹³ The military carried out an airstrike on the KNPLF headquarters four days after the initial clash,¹⁴ followed by additional airstrikes on KNPLF bases. On 23 June, the joint forces captured No.13 Border Point, the last strategic hill camp of the military in the area. This reportedly led to the surrender of dozens of military soldiers.¹⁵ Towards the end of the month, the military recaptured two BGF outposts that had been seized by resistance forces in the state.¹⁶

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Pakistan: TTP increases activity in Balochistan

While violence in Balochistan continued in June at lower levels than in May, instability in Balochistan has enabled non-state actors other than Baloch separatists to make inroads into the province. Notably, events involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Balochistan this year already exceed the seven events recorded for all of 2022. During the first six months of 2023, ACLED records nine political violence events involving the TTP in Balochistan, including the TTP targeting a police vehicle in Dera Murad Jamali town on 9 June.¹⁷ Since July 2022, four Baloch groups have joined the TTP, thus allowing it to strengthen its presence in the region.¹⁸ Notably, in addition to the wilaya (administrative region) formed in Zhob in 2022, the TTP recently reportedly formed a new wilaya in the Kalat and Makran regions.¹⁹ The Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), a militant group that emerged in February this year, has also become active in Balochistan. During an operation in Chaman tehsil (district subdivision) on 14 June, four TJP militants were reportedly killed in a clash with police.²⁰ While little is known about the group, there is indication they share similar goals with the TTP.²¹

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Philippines: Two DI-Maute Group leaders killed

Two high-ranking leaders of the Dawlah Islamiyah (DI)-Maute Group, an Islamic State (IS)-inspired group in the Philippines best known for leading a siege on the city of Marawi in 2017,²² were killed in June. Faharudin Hadji Benito Satar, better known as Abu Zachariah, was killed in a military operation in Marawi on 14 June.²³ Zachariah had been the emir or highest-ranked leader of IS in Southeast Asia since 2022²⁴ and was reportedly among the leaders of the 2017 Marawi siege, a five-month offensive by IS-inspired militants seeking to establish the city as the capital of an IS wilaya in Southeast Asia.²⁵ Another senior DI-Maute Group leader handling finance and logistics was killed in a follow-up operation by state forces a few hours later. The commander of the Philippine military’s Western Mindanao Command said that the killing of the two IS-inspired leaders was a “significant breakthrough” against DI.²⁶ The United States State Department also commented on the news, saying it was the result of the Philippines’ “persistent and years-long effort to rid the country of ISIS.”²⁷ DI-Maute Group activity has declined significantly since the 2017 Marawi siege. Thus far in 2023, ACLED records four political violence events involving the DI-Maute Group, compared to 182 in 2017.

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Vietnam: Rare violence in the Central Highlands

On 14 June, armed assailants attacked the headquarters of the People’s Committees of Ea Tieu and Ea Ktur communes in Dak Lak province, located in the Central Highlands of Vietnam.²⁸ A total of nine people were reportedly killed, including four police officers, two commune officials, and three villagers, while two other police officers sustained serious injuries. Three civilians who had been taken hostage were eventually released unharmed. The authorities seized a significant cache of weapons, including guns, grenades, bullets, and detonators.²⁹ In the aftermath of the incident, dozens of suspects were charged for their alleged involvement in the attack. The Central Highlands are home to the Montagnard ethnic minority, who have faced restrictions and land confiscations by the government.³⁰ The motive behind the attack remains unclear, though police have attempted to link the assailants to the defunct separatist group United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, saying that flags of the group were found among the attackers’ belongings. Montagnard organizations have denied any association with the violence.³¹

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Armenia-Azerbaijan: Fighting intensifies further amid near-complete blockade of Artsakh

Armed clashes along the Armenia-Artsakh¹-Azerbaijan Line of Contact more than doubled in June compared to May. Overall levels of armed violence reached their highest point since the latest major spike in hostilities in the region in autumn 2022. ACLED records 126 armed clashes in June, compared with 82 and 87 in September and November last year. In addition to hotspots around Artsakh and along Armenia’s eastern border with Azerbaijan, a significant number of ceasefire violations occurred around the Armenian town of Yeraskh on the border with Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave. During fighting in June, at least four military fatalities were reported, all due to Azerbaijani drone strikes at Artsakh positions on 28 June. 

Amid escalating tensions, Armenian forces shot at Azerbaijani border guards attempting to install an Azerbaijani flag in front of a Russian peacekeepers’ border checkpoint on 15 June. The Russian checkpoint is located on a bridge over the Hakari river, where Azerbaijan installed a checkpoint of its own in late April. The incident led to Azerbaijan completely closing the Lachin corridor linking Armenia and Artsakh, intensifying the humanitarian crisis in the latter.² Azerbaijan subsequently allowed medical evacuations from Artsakh to Armenia and the movement of medical supplies to the enclave,³ after Russian peacekeepers airlifted a critically ill baby from Artsakh to Armenia.⁴ Despite the violence and inflammatory announcements, both sides claimed unspecified progress during United States-mediated peace talks on a draft agreement.⁵ Prior to the negotiations, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov dismissed Armenian demands that security guarantees be provided to ethnic Armenians remaining in Artsakh as part of any settlement.⁶ In addition, a senior Azerbaijani military officer threatened the use of force against Artsakh armed formations in response to “provocations or illegal actions.”⁷ 

The conflict over Artsakh has persisted since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Artsakh won a secession war against Azerbaijan in 1994, with the latter regaining parts of Artsakh and adjacent areas after another war in 2020.

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France: Police shooting of teenager sparks nationwide riots

A video of a police officer fatally shooting a teenager of North African heritage on 27 June during a traffic check in Nanterre, a suburb west of Paris, triggered a wave of riots in about 250 French cities and towns. While reminiscent of the unrest prompted by the death of two teenagers in a police chase in 2005, the rioting has extended beyond the poorer outskirts of French cities.⁸ It has been the worst outburst of street violence since ACLED coverage began in 2020, exceeding levels of violent demonstrations triggered by minimum retirement age reforms since the beginning of the year. The demonstrations quickly deteriorated, with some participants smashing windows, setting cars and buildings on fire, throwing fireworks at riot police, and barricading streets. The capital city of Paris and the surrounding area, as well as other major urban centers, including  Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse, and Strasbourg, were particularly affected. There were also multiple reports of shops looted. A youth died when he fell while attempting to break into a shop from its roof in Petit-Quevilly in northwestern France. Authorities struggled to re-impose public order despite deploying thousands of police officers to the streets at night⁹ and imposing curfews in dozens of cities and towns.¹⁰ About 700 police personnel were injured¹¹ in clashes with rioters, over 3,000 of whom were detained.¹² 

Mayor’s offices and municipal buildings, along with other public buildings such as schools and police stations, appeared to have been particularly targeted, with reports of at least 150 incidents. There were also reports of targeting mayors, including direct attacks and setting their vehicles on fire. In an incident that occurred overnight on 2 July in L’Haÿ-les-Roses, a suburb south of Paris, perpetrators rammed open and set alight the house of a mayor, whose wife and two children had to escape the flames while the mayor was guarding the mayor’s office.¹³ The woman and one of the children were injured as a result. The violence prompted rallies in support of local officials and calls for a “return to civil peace.”¹⁴ The riots appeared to be waning following the weekend of 30 June. The police officer who shot the teenager in Nanterre is being investigated for manslaughter.   

For more information on violence against officials in France and the European Union at large, see ACLED’s special project on violence targeting local officials

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Kosovo-Serbia: Standoff over northern Kosovo municipalities continues

Demonstrations continued unabated in northern Kosovo in response to an attempt by Kosovan authorities in late May to install ethnic Albanian mayors in Serb-majority areas following the mass boycott of snap local polls. Ethnic Serbian residents in Kosovo’s Mitrovica region took to the streets almost daily, also demonstrating against the arrests of members of the ethnic Serbian community suspected of targeting peacekeepers and journalists during clashes the previous month. Journalists covering demonstrations were again targeted on four occasions in June. Kosovo police arrested a Serb mob leader on 13 June, and Sergian forces detained three Kosovan police officers in a border area between Kosovo and Serbia the following day, further fuelling tensions in the region.¹⁵ Kosovo authorities beefed up security checks on the border with Serbia and briefly closed two border crossings.¹⁶ 

Amid ongoing tensions, EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell hosted separate emergency talks with Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić on 22 June, demanding a de-escalation of the crisis and the re-run of the disputed mayoral elections in northern Kosovo.¹⁷ Following the talks, Serbia released the three detained Kosovan policemen on 26 June.¹⁸ Meanwhile, Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti reiterated his willingness to re-run the mayoral elections in northern Kosovo, with the condition that at least 20% of constituents petition for them.¹⁹ Furthermore, local authorities designated two Serbian groups operating in northern Kosovo as ‘terrorist’ groups on 29 June,²⁰ a step that may lead to continuing tensions. 

Ethnic Albanian-majority Kosovo broke away from Serbia in 2008 in the aftermath of the civil war occurring a decade earlier. The issue of granting self-governance to ethnic Serbian-majority areas in northern Kosovo has remained unresolved since, leading to frequent flare-ups in the region.²¹

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Russia: Wagner Group rebels

The Wagner Group’s simmering dispute with the Russian Ministry of Defense came to a head on 24 June, prompted by the ministry’s order earlier that month that all armed “volunteer formations” come into its fold.²² On the morning of 24 June – after having accused regular Russian units of targeting a Wagner camp in the occupied part of Ukraine’s Donbas on the eve²³ – a 10,000-strong group with heavy weapons crossed into Russia and occupied military sites in and near Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh. Meeting no apparent resistance from the regular military and law enforcement, the group continued toward Moscow, ostensibly seeking to hold the defense ministry’s leadership to account.²⁴ 

In response, Russian authorities accused the group of launching an armed rebellion, blocked major highways leading to Moscow, and announced a counter-terrorist operation.²⁵ The Russian Air Force bombed advancing Wagner columns during their initial drive on Rostov-on-Don and subsequent move in the Voronezh region, losing six military helicopters, a command-and-control bomber jet, and 13 crew members in the process.²⁶ A projectile fired by a Wagner fighter aiming at a Russian military chopper hit a kerosene tanker in Voronezh city prompting a massive fire. Later in the day, Russian air forces blew up a bridge near the Voronezh region’s town of Borisoglebsk. Three civilians, including a child, were injured while crossing the bridge in a car.      

In the evening, when Wagner columns had reached the Lipetsk region about 200 kilometers south of Moscow, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenka claimed to have negotiated a settlement with the Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. Lukashenka claimed Prigozhn agreed to return his columns to Wagner camps in exchange for amnesty and a safe haven in Belarus.²⁷ President Vladimir Putin subsequently offered Wagner Group members a choice of either entering into contracts with the Ministry of Defence, quitting, or re-deploying to Belarus.²⁸

Force generation issues due to the war against Ukraine since February 2022 have led to a proliferation of paramilitary groups created by Russian regional authorities and private conglomerates. Subsequently, this has stirred strife with the regular Russian army and among the irregular armed formations themselves. This deteriorating internal insecurity comes at a time of increasing direct spillover of the Ukraine war in Russia’s border regions. The number of cross-border shelling incidents increased to 180 in May from a base of about 50 events on average since October 2022, and rose by a further quarter in June. Moreover, drone strikes on areas further away from the border continued. Pro-Ukrainian Russian militants also undertook another raid across the border in the Belgorod region, in addition to an incursion in the same region the previous month and two other raids in March and April.

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Ukraine: Russia destroys critical dam to stave off Ukrainian counter-offensive

On 6 June, in the Kherson region, the Nova Kakhovka dam on the Dnipro river collapsed following the alleged detonation of explosives by Russian forces. The dam’s collapse led to the flooding of dozens of settlements downstream, leading to the reported deaths of 21 civilians in Ukrainian-controlled areas and 46 others in the Russian-occupied part of the region, with scores missing and thousands displaced.²⁹ This contributed to an over 60% increase in civilian fatalities in June compared to May. An internal blast at the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant occupied by the Russian forces likely caused the destruction of the dam.³⁰ The resulting flood may have blocked potential Ukrainian crossing of the river,³¹ though the flood also washed away Russian defenses on the Dnipro shore.³² While Russian occupation authorities were slow to respond to the unfolding humanitarian crisis,³³ Russian forces shelled evacuating civilians in and near the city of Kherson, reportedly killing at least six people, including a pregnant woman, and wounding about 40 others. Russia also denied the United Nations access to affected areas.³⁴ Elsewhere in Ukraine, indiscriminate Russian shelling, aerial and missile strikes, and the debris from intercepted projectiles and drones led to over 130 civilian fatalities, with Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk regions among the most affected. 

The overall levels of violence in Ukraine have been on a slow upward trend, in line with the ACLED Conflict Alert System (CAST) projections. While shelling events remained at similar levels compared to May, armed clashes surged significantly in the Zaporizhia region and also increased in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Despite initial setbacks since the beginning of the counter-offensive in early June,³⁵ Ukrainian forces liberated a string of settlements south of Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk region near the boundary with the Zaporizhia region as well as several settlements in the latter region south of Orikhiv. In addition, Ukrainian forces secured marginal gains around recently Russian-captured Bakhmut. Fighting also continued to be concentrated on the Avdiivka-Donetsk city line and the Kupiansk-Svatove-Kreminna line further north on the boundary between Luhansk and Kharkiv regions. 

For more information, see ACLED’s Ukraine Conflict Monitor

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United States: Ongoing far-right militia, militant social movement, and white supremacist training events and other activities

Activity involving far-right groups and militant social movements continued at a roughly stable rate in June compared to May. In Arizona – the state with the highest levels of far-right activity in June – the Lions of Liberty, along with the Maricopa County, Chino Valley, and Verde Valley Preparedness Teams, continued to hold regular informational recruitment meetings. Meanwhile, Veterans on Patrol (VOP) activity in Arizona increased moderately in June, while Proud Boys activity roughly doubled following a lull in activity in May. All Proud Boy activity in June involved anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations, in line with the increasing engagement of far-right groups on anti-LGBTQ+ issues observed in 2022 (for more, see ACLED’s fact sheet: Anti-LBGTQ+ Mobilization in the United States). The group also participated in two violent demonstrations in Glendale, California.¹

Openly white supremacist activity also continued in June. A coalition of white supremacist organizations, including various Active Clubs, the Rose City Nationalists (RCN), Vinland Rebels, and White Lives Matter affiliates, formed in early 2023 called the Northwest Nationalist Network (3N). This coalition became more active in demonstrations in June, attending at least two anti-LGBTQ+ events. In addition, a training and networking event involving Patriot Front and the Cincinnati Active Club suggests that coalition-building between openly white supremacist groups may be increasing. Meanwhile, the Goyim Defense League (GDL) increased its distribution of antisemitic fliers last month, dropping them in California, Georgia, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania. Over half of these flier distributions occurred in California. The GDL was also present at two demonstrations at synagogues in Florida on 23 and 24 June. During the 23 June demonstration, the group’s leader was arrested for disorderly conduct. White nationalist fliers were also distributed by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, Patriot Front, and White Lives Matter (WLM). As a result, June marked the largest number of recorded flier drops in a single month by these groups since ACLED began collecting data for the United States in 2020.

Patriot Front activity decreased moderately overall in June compared to May. However, affiliates of the group held training sessions in at least nine different states and dropped banners in at least seven. Additionally, they were present in at least two separate anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations. Meanwhile, white supremacist Active Clubs – inspired by and loosely affiliated with the Rise Above Movement – also held training sessions in three states and participated in two anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations, marking the most active month for Active Clubs since 2020.

Despite ongoing cross-pollination between various far-right militant social movements and white supremacist groups, a notable incident during a 24 June anti-LGBTQ+ demonstration in Oregon City, Oregon, may have marked a turning point in the relationships between certain actors. During the demonstration, members of the Proud Boys brawled with the members of the RCN, pulling face coverings off of RCN members’ faces, removing the public anonymity that members of both groups generally try to preserve. The brawl appears to have originated from a personal dispute but involved multiple members of both groups.² Following the fight, acrimony between the two groups appears to have spread online. Members of white nationalist Telegram channels openly threatened and criticized the Proud Boys, and at least one Proud Boys chapter distanced itself from others as a “Rebel Chapter” that openly embraces white nationalism.³ At the same time, other Proud Boy chapters showed support for the chapter in Oregon and posted anti-white supremacist messages.

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United States and Canada: Rise in pro-LGBTQ+ and anti-LGBTQ+ activity during Pride Month

During Pride Month in June, demonstrations in opposition to LGBTQ+ rights rose to the highest single-month levels ever recorded in the United States. Following a trend seen in previous months, many of these demonstrations were held in opposition to drag and Pride events, in addition to other forms of LGBTQ+ expression as well as gender-affirming care. Anti-LGBTQ+ activity was recorded in 26 states and Washington, DC during the month, but concentrated in California, New York, and Texas, with just under 20% of all anti-LGBTQ+ events taking place in California. Nevertheless, demonstrations supporting LGBTQ+ rights outpaced anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations by more than double, and around half of all anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations were met by opposing demonstrators who showed support for LGBTQ+ rights. 

Similarly, Canada experienced its highest recorded levels of both pro-LGBTQ+ and anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations since ACLED began collecting data for the country in 2021. Pro-LGBTQ+ demonstrations outpaced anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations by roughly 50%. Anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations occurred in five provinces, with over 50% of these demonstrations taking place in Ontario. Over 70% of anti-LGBTQ+ demonstrations were met by opposing demonstrators showing support for LGBTQ+ rights.

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